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Abstract—We study communication-constrained networked
control problems for linear time-invariant systems in the presence
of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, namely attacks that prevent
transmissions over the communication network. Our work aims
at exploring the relationship between system resilience and net-
work bandwidth capacity. Given a class of DoS attacks, we first
characterize time-invariant bit-rate bounds that are dependent
on the unstable eigenvalues of the dynamic matrix of the plant
and the parameters of DoS attacks, beyond which exponential
stability of the closed-loop system can be guaranteed. Second,
we design the time-varying bit-rate protocol and show that it
can enable the system to maintain the comparable robustness as
the one under the time-invariant bit-rate protocol and meanwhile
promote the possibility of transmitting fewer bits especially when
the attack levels are low. Our characterization clearly shows the
trade-off between the communication bandwidth and resilience
against DoS. An example is given to illustrate the proposed
solution approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have attracted much atten-
tion due to the advances in automation. Integrating commu-
nication and computation technologies, CPSs have a broad
spectrum of applications ranging from small local control sys-
tems to large-scale systems, some of which are safety-critical.
This raises the issue of reliability of CPSs to a considerable
important level. Among a variety of aspects in reliability
problems, the security of CPSs becomes a challenge from
both practical and theoretical points of view. Here the concept
of CPSs security mostly concerns the resilience against or
protection from malicious attacks, e.g. deceptive attacks and
Denial-of-Service (DoS) [1], [2].
This paper deals with resilient control under DoS attacks.
We consider a basic problem where the network has limited
bandwidth and is subject to DoS attacks, and the intention
of the attacker is to induce instability. This implies that the
signals transmitted over such a network are subject to both
quantization and dropout. It is well known that an insufficient
bit rate in the communication channel influences the stability
of a networked control system [3], not to mention packet drops
[4]. Hence, the topic of networked control under data rate
constraints and random packet dropouts has been investigated
by many researchers. However, those results may not be
applicable in the context of DoS since the communication
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failures induced by DoS can exhibit a temporal profile quite
different from the one induced by genuine packet losses;
particularly packet dropouts induced by DoS need not follow
a given class of probability distributions [5]. This poses new
challenges in theoretical analysis and controller design.
The literature on networked control with bit-rate limita-
tion is large and diverse [6]–[12] and the problem when
quantization and genuine packet losses coexist has been well
studied, see [13]–[19]. In [8], the authors obtain necessary
and sufficient conditions concerning the observability and sta-
bilization for the networked control of a linear time-invariant
system under communication constraints. These conditions are
independent of information patterns and only reliant on the
inherent property of the considered plant, i.e. the unstable
eigenvalues of the dynamic matrix of the plant. The papers
[13], [19] investigate the minimum data rate problem for mean
square stability under Markovian packet losses. Necessary and
sufficient conditions for stabilization are obtained for both
scalar and vector systems.
Recently, systems under DoS attacks have been studied
from the control-theoretic viewpoint [20]–[33]. In [20], a
framework is introduced where DoS attacks are characterized
by frequency and duration. The contribution is an explicit
characterization of DoS frequency and duration under which
stability can be preserved through state-feedback control.
Extensions have been considered dealing with self-triggered
networks [28] and nonlinear systems [29]. In [21], the authors
generalize this model and consider a scenario where malicious
attacks and genuine packet losses coexist, in which the effect
of malicious attacks and random packet losses are merged
and characterized by an overall packet drop ratio. In [22],
the authors investigate launching DoS attacks optimally to a
network with genuine packet losses. Specifically, the attacker
aims at maximizing the estimation error with constrained
energy. In [23], the authors formulate a two-player zero-
sum stochastic game framework to consider a remote secure
estimation problem, where the signals are transmitted over
a multi-channel network under DoS attacks. A game-theory-
based model where transmitters and jammers have multiple
choices of sending and interfering power is considered in [24].
The recent paper [25] investigates the stabilization problem of
a discrete-time output feedback system under quantization and
DoS attacks. In the event of the satisfaction of a certain norm
condition, a lower bound of quantization level and an upper
bound of DoS duration are obtained together guaranteeing
stability.
In this paper, we consider the stabilization problem of a
linear time-invariant continuous process, possibly open-loop
unstable and with complex eigenvalues, where the commu-
nication between sensor and controller takes place over a
bit-rate limited and unreliable digital channel. Previously,
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2we have shown that a controller with prediction capability
significantly promotes the resilience of a networked control
system against DoS in the sense that the missing signals
induced by DoS attacks can be reconstructed and then applied
for computing the control input [26], [27], [32]. Under proper
design, the system can achieve ISS-like robust stability or
asymptotic stability in the presence or absence of disturbance
and noise, respectively. However, when the network has lim-
ited bandwidth, the existing results are not applicable any
longer because signal deviation induced by quantization cannot
be simply treated as bounded noise, and such signal deviation
influences the accuracy of estimation/prediction and hence the
resilience of the closed-loop system.
Therefore, there is a trade-off between communication
bandwidth and system resilience. An interesting question is to
find how large the bit rate must be to ensure the stability of a
system under DoS, possibly an open-loop unstable system. We
may state this question in another way as how much the limited
bit rate degrades the robustness of a networked control system
in the context of stabilization. We follow the approach aligned
with that for the minimum data rate control problems discussed
above. In particular, we recover those results in the case
without any DoS. Exploiting the techniques of transformation,
we associate the bit rates with the eigenvalues of the dynamic
matrix of the process and DoS parameters, and explicitly
characterize the relationship between system resilience and
bit rates. Specifically, we compute a bit-rate bound element-
wise, larger than which the closed-loop system is exponen-
tially stable. This on the other hand reveals the “robustness
degradation” induced by quantization. In addition, assuming
that the communication protocol is acknowledgment-based,
we propose a time-varying bit-rate design where the packet
size is time-varying. This enables us to preserve a comparable
level of robustness against DoS and meanwhile promotes the
possibility of saving transmitted bits especially when the attack
levels are low.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
introduce the framework consisting of system transformations,
a class of DoS attacks and the contribution of this paper.
Section III is the core part of this paper. Considering that
the data rate is time-invariant, we accordingly choose the
uniform quantizer and design the predictor. The dynamics of
quantization range and prediction error are analyzed. Then we
conduct the stability analysis. In Section IV, the time-varying
bit-rate protocol is introduced, which can stabilize the system
and save communication resources. A numerical example is
introduced in Section V, and finally Section VI ends the paper
with conclusions and possible future research directions.
Notation. We denote by R the set of reals. Given b ∈ R,
R≥b and R>b denote the sets of reals no smaller than b
and reals greater than b, respectively; R≤b and R<b represent
the sets of reals no larger than b and reals smaller than b,
respectively; Z denotes the set of integers. For any c ∈ Z, we
denote Zc := {c, c + 1, · · · }. Let bxc be the floor function
such that bxc = max{k ∈ Z|k ≤ x}. Also, let dxe be the
ceiling function such that dxe = min{k ∈ Z|k ≥ x}. Given a
vector β, ‖β‖ is its Euclidean norm. Given a matrix Γ, ‖Γ‖
represents its spectral norm and ΓT is its transpose. Given an
interval I, |I| denotes its length. The Kronecker product is
denoted by ⊗. Finally, given a signal F , F(t−) denotes the
limit from below at t.
II. FRAMEWORK
A. System description
Consider the networked control architecture in Figure 1. The
process is a linear time-invariant continuous system given by
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) (1)
where t ∈ R≥0, x(t) ∈ Rnx is the state with x(0) arbitrary,
A ∈ Rnx×nx , B ∈ Rnx×nu , u(t) ∈ Rnu is the control input
and (A,B) is stabilizable. Let K ∈ Rnu×nx be a matrix such
that the real part of each eigenvalue of A + BK is strictly
negative. Let λr = cr ± dri be the eigenvalues of A with
cr, dr ∈ R, where c1, c2, c3, · · · are distinct and i represents
the imaginary number. If dr = 0 then λr has only real part and
corresponds to a real eigenvalue such that λr = cr. If dr 6= 0,
λr represents a pair of complex eigenvalues whose real part is
cr and imaginary parts are dri and −dri, respectively. In the
following sections, the real part of λr is denoted by cr, where
we do not distinguish if λr is real or complex. We assume
that the state is measurable by sensors.
The measurement channel has limited bandwidth and is
moreover subject to DoS attacks. The transmission attempts
between the encoder and decoder are carried out periodically
with interval ∆, i.e.
tk+1 − tk = ∆ (2)
where {tk}k∈Z0 = {t0, t1, · · · } denotes the sequence of
the instants of transmission attempts. By convention, we let
t0 = 0. Moreover, we assume that the network communication
protocol is acknowledgment-based (like the TCP protocol)
without any delay in terms of both encoded signal and
acknowledgment transmissions.
Process Sensor Encoder
Decoder
Network 
with DoS
Control system
Actuator
Fig. 1. Controller and actuator co-location architecture
Since we consider a controller-actuator co-location ar-
chitecture (cf. Figure 1), only the measurement channel is
subject to DoS, and the control channel is free from DoS
disruptions and always available. Due to DoS attacks, not
all the transmission attempts succeed. Hence, we denote by
{zm}m∈Z0 = {z0, z1, · · · } ⊆ {tk}k∈Z0 the sequence of the
time instants at which successful transmissions occur.
3B. System transformation
In order to facilitate the analysis in Sections III and IV, we
carry out two transformations in this subsection.
First, we transform the original process (1) into the real
Jordan canonical form. Let S ∈ Rnx×nx be a transformation
matrix such that (1) can be rewritten as
˙˜x(t) = A˜x˜(t) + B˜u(t) (3)
where x˜(t) = Sx(t), t ∈ R≥0 and A˜ ∈ Rnx×nx is the Jordan
form of A such that
A˜ = SAS−1 = diag(A1, A2, · · · , Ap), p ∈ Z1 (4)
in which p represents the number of Jordan blocks. Let
r = 1, 2, · · · , p. The Jordan block associated with the real
eigenvalue λr = cr is
Ar =

cr 1
cr 1
. . . 1
cr
 ∈ Rnr×nr (5)
where nr is the order of Ar. The Jordan block associated with
the complex eigenvalues λr = cr ± dri (dr 6= 0) is
Ar =

Dr I
Dr I
. . . I
Dr
 ∈ R2nr×2nr (6)
with
Dr =
[
cr −dr
dr cr
]
, I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
(7)
where 2nr is the order of Ar [34]. Meanwhile we have
B˜ = SB ∈ Rnx×nu . If A has only real eigenvalues, the
Jordan form of A in (4) with the Jordan blocks in (5) is
sufficient for further development. However, in the event of the
existence of complex eigenvalues in A, we need one more step
of transformation, which is carried out by the lemma below.
Lemma 1: Consider the process in (3) where A˜ is in the
Jordan form as in (4). There exists a transformation x¯(t) =
E(t)x˜(t) such that (3) can be transformed into
˙¯x(t) = A¯x¯(t) + B¯(t)u(t) (8)
where
A¯ = E(t)A˜E(t)−1 + E˙(t)E(t)−1
=

A¯1
A¯2
. . .
A¯p
 , p ∈ Z1 (9)
with
A¯r = Ar =

cr 1
cr 1
. . . 1
cr
 ∈ Rnr×nr (10)
corresponding to the real eigenvalue λr = cr, and
A¯r =

cr 1
cr 1
. . . 1
cr
⊗ I ∈ R2nr×2nr (11)
corresponding to the complex eigenvalues λr = cr ± dri with
dr 6= 0. Besides, B¯(t) = E(t)B˜.
Proof. We refer the readers to the Appendix for the proof
including the design of E(t). 
In [8] and [35], similar techniques of transformation where
the transformation matrix is time-varying are used. It is
trivial to mention that one can directly transform (1) into
(8) by computing A¯ = E(t)SAS−1E(t)−1 + E˙(t)E(t)−1
and B¯(t) = E(t)SB. In case of the existence of complex
eigenvalues, E(t) is a time-varying matrix. This implies that
B¯(t) is time-varying.
C. Time-constrained DoS
We refer to DoS as the phenomenon for which some
transmission attempts may fail. We consider a general DoS
model that constrains the attacker action in time by only posing
limitations on the frequency of DoS attacks and their duration.
Let {hn}n∈Z0 with h0 ≥ 0 denote the sequence of DoS off/on
transitions, that is, the time instants at which DoS exhibits
a transition from zero (transmissions are successful) to one
(transmissions are not successful). Hence,
Hn := {hn} ∪ [hn, hn + τn[ (12)
represents the n-th DoS time-interval, of a length τn ∈ R≥0,
over which the network is in DoS status. If τn = 0, then Hn
takes the form of a single pulse at hn. Given τ, t ∈ R≥0 with
t ≥ τ , let n(τ, t) denote the number of DoS off/on transitions
over [τ, t], and let
Ξ(τ, t) :=
⋃
n∈Z0
Hn
⋂
[τ, t] (13)
be the subset of [τ, t] where the network is in DoS status.
Assumption 1: (DoS frequency). There exist constants η ∈
R≥0 and τD ∈ R>0 such that
n(τ, t) ≤ η + t− τ
τD
(14)
for all τ, t ∈ R≥0 with t ≥ τ . 
Assumption 2: (DoS duration). There exist constants κ ∈
R≥0 and T ∈ R>1 such that
|Ξ(τ, t)| ≤ κ+ t− τ
T
(15)
for all τ, t ∈ R≥0 with t ≥ τ . 
Remark 1: Assumptions 1 and 2 do only constrain a given
DoS signal in terms of its average frequency and duration.
Following [36], τD can be defined as the average dwell-
time between consecutive DoS off/on transitions, while η
is the chattering bound. Assumption 2 expresses a similar
requirement with respect to the duration of DoS. It expresses
the property that, on the average, the total duration over
which communication is interrupted does not exceed a certain
4fraction of time, as specified by 1/T . Like η, the constant κ
plays the role of a regularization term. It is needed because
during a DoS interval, one has |Ξ(hn, hn+τn)| = τn > τn/T .
Thus κ serves to make (15) consistent. Conditions τD > 0 and
T > 1 imply that DoS cannot occur at an infinitely fast rate
or be always active. 
The next lemma relates DoS parameters and the time
elapsing between successful transmissions.
Lemma 2: Consider periodic transmission attempts tk+1 −
tk = ∆, along with a DoS attack satisfying Assumptions 1 and
2. If 1T +
∆
τD
< 1, then the sequence of successful transmissions
satisfies z0 ≤ Q and zm+1 − zm ≤ Q + ∆ for all m ∈ Z0,
where
Q := (κ+ η∆)
(
1− 1
T
− ∆
τD
)−1
. (16)
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 in [32] carries over to this
lemma with s0, sr+1 and sr replaced by z0, zm+1 and zm,
respectively. 
The following lemma presents the relationship between DoS
parameters, time and the number of successful transmissions
therein.
Lemma 3: Consider the DoS attacks characterized by
Assumptions 1 and 2. The number of successful transmissions
within the interval [z0, zm[, which is denoted by TS(z0, zm),
satisfies
TS(z0, zm) ≥
1− 1T − ∆τD
∆
(zm − z0)− κ+ η∆
∆
(17)
where zm ≥ z0 and ∆ is as in (2).
Proof. Consider an interval [z0, zm] with zm ≥ z0 and let
Hn represent the n-th DoS time-interval within [z0, zm] here.
One can verify that the number of unsuccessful transmissions
during Hn is no larger than τn∆ + 1. Hence the number of
unsuccessful transmissions during [z0, zm] satisfies
TU (z0, zm) ≤
n(z0,zm)−1∑
k=0
(
τk
∆
+ 1)
≤ |Ξ(z0, zm)|
∆
+ n(z0, zm) (18)
Let TA(z0, zm) = zm−z0∆ + 1 denote the number of total
transmission attempts during [z0, zm]. Note that TA(z0, zm)
and TS(z0, zm) are defined corresponding to the intervals
[z0, zm] and [z0, zm[, respectively. Therefore it follows from
(14), (15), and (18) that TS(z0, zm) satisfies
TS(z0, zm) = TA(z0, zm)− TU (z0, zm)− 1
≥ 1−
1
T − ∆τD
∆
(zm − z0)− κ+ η∆
∆
(19)

Remark 2: In the scenario of a reliable network (T =
τd = ∞ and κ = η = 0), Q in Lemma 2 becomes zero,
and TU (z0, zm) = 0 implies TS(z0, zm) = TA(z0, zm) − 1.
This means that every transmission attempt ends up with a
successful transmission. Thus, Lemmas 2 and 3 describe the
functioning of a standard periodic transmission policy. 
D. Literature review
The robustness problem of the structure as in Figure 1
has been investigated in [26] and [27], where we assumed
the network has infinite bandwidth and the measurements are
not quantized. For the ease of comparison and clarifying the
contribution of this paper, we briefly recall the controller and
the result in [27]. The control system is given by
u(t) = Kξ(t) ξ˙(t) = Aξ(t) +Bu(t), if t 6= zmξ(t) = x(t) + n(t), if t = zm
(20)
where ξ(t) is the estimation of x(t) and n(t) represents
bounded noises.
Theorem 1: [27] Consider the dynamical system as in (1)
under a co-located control system as in (20). The closed-loop
system is stable for any DoS sequence satisfying Assumptions
1 and 2 with arbitrary η and κ, and with τD and T such that
1
T
+
∆
τD
< 1 (21)

It is trivial that in case n(t) = 0, the result above still holds.
E. Paper contribution
Exploiting the controller in (20) and the architecture in Fig-
ure 1, we first design the encoder and decoder such that they
are free of over-flow of quantization range even in the presence
of DoS attacks. After fixing the control system’s structure, the
number of bits Rr for coding is the only parameter to be taken
care of. Given the control framework, the contribution of this
paper is mostly in finding the appropriate Rr, possibly under
the presence of DoS attacks.
The main contribution of this paper is two-fold.
i) The first contribution is to show that the closed-loop
system is exponentially stable if the time-invariant bit
rate Rr satisfies
Rr
{
> 1
1− 1T − ∆τD
cr∆ log2 e, if cr ≥ 0
≥ 0, if cr < 0
(22)
where Rr represents the number of bits applied to the
signals corresponding the r-th block in A¯. The condition
(22) is general enough in the sense that in the absence
of DoS attacks, the result of minimum data rate control
is recovered (cf. Remark 4). On the other hand, we
characterize the robustness of the system, namely the
amount of DoS attacks less than which stability can be
still preserved. One can preserve closed-loop stability if
the frequency and duration of DoS attacks satisfy
1
T
+
∆
τD
< 1− cr∆ log2 e
Rr
, ∀cr ≥ 0 (23)
where Rr > 0. Clearly, the signal inaccuracy due to
quantization cannot be simply treated as the one caused
by measurement noises in the sense that the noises do not
enter the right-hand side of (21), whereas the quantization
5degrades the system’s robustness by diminishing the
right-hand side of (21) into (23). This implies that some
DoS attacks that used to be tolerable would now cause
instability.
ii) As a second contribution, we propose the time-varying
bit-rate protocol consisting of bit-computing parts and
coding parts in both the encoding and decoding systems.
The bit-computing parts are able to generate sequences
of time instants. By resorting to using acknowledgments,
the sequences of time instants can be synchronized in the
encoding and decoding systems. Based on the generated
time sequences (under the influences of DoS), the number
of bits applied for each transmission attempt can be pre-
determined. If the DoS attack is short, a number of bits no
larger than Rr could guarantee the decay of quantization
range, and there is no need to apply Rr, which leads to
the possibility of saving bits. Under suitable choices of
parameters, we show that the closed-loop system is stable
if the maximum number of bits that the encoding and
decoding systems can apply in one transmission attempt
satisfies (22).
III. TIME-INVARIANT BIT RATE
In this section, we introduce the design of the encoding and
decoding systems, and the control system, where the number
of bits used for coding are time-invariant.
A. Uniform quantizer
The limitation of bandwidth implies that transmitted signals
are subject to quantization. Let
χl :=
el
jl
(24)
be the original l-th signal before quantization and qRl(χl)
represents the quantized signal of χl with Rl bits, where l =
1, 2, 3, · · · , nx. The choices of Rl, el ∈ R and jl ∈ R>0 will
be specified later. We implement a uniform quantizer such that
qRl(χl) :=
{
b2Rl−1χlc+0.5
2Rl−1 , if − 1 ≤ χl < 1
1− 0.5
2Rl−1 , if χl = 1
(25)
if Rl ∈ Z1 and
qRl(χl) = 0 (26)
if Rl = 0. Note that for any jl ∈ R>0 the following property
holds: ∣∣∣∣el − jlqRl (eljl
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ jl2Rl , if |el|jl ≤ 1 (27)
for both cases, namely Rl ∈ Z0 [13], [17]. For the ease of
visualizing (25), Figure 2 shows the quantization function with
Rl = 2. The quantizer applied in the time-varying bit-rate
protocol will be presented in Section IV.
-1 -0.5 0.5 1
-0.25
-0.75
0.25
0.75
0
2
( )
l
q 
l

Fig. 2. Example of quantization with Rl = 2. For instance, any number
falling into [0, 0.5[ would be quantized into 0.25.
B. Control architecture
The basic idea of the control system design is that we equip
the encoding and decoding systems with prediction capability
to properly quantize data and more importantly predict the
missing signals that are interrupted by DoS. Specifically, the
encoding system outputs quantized signals and transmits them
to the decoding system through a DoS-corrupted network. The
decoding system attempts to predict future signals based on the
received quantized signals. Notice that the following design is
based on ˙¯x(t) = A¯x¯(t) + B¯(t)u(t).
As shown in Figure 3, on the sensor side the encoding
system is embedded with a predictor for predicting x¯(t).
Let xˆ(t) = [xˆ1(t) xˆ2(t) · · · xˆnx(t)]T denote the prediction
of x¯(t) = [x¯1(t) x¯2(t) · · · x¯nx(t)]T. The error e(t) =
[e1(t) e2(t) · · · enx(t)]T describes the discrepancy between
x¯(t) and xˆ(t), where
el(t) := xˆl(t)− x¯l(t), l = 1, 2, · · · , nx. (28)
Furthermore, we will design a dynamic system (see (31)-
(32) below), whose state J(t) = [j1(t) j2(t) · · · jnx(t)]T
is always positive. Namely, it is jl(t) > 0 for t ∈ R≥0, where
jl(t) represents the quantization range that bounds the error,
i.e. jl(t) ≥ |el(t)| for t ∈ R≥0 as it will be shown in the
next subsection. Recalling that χl(t) :=
el(t)
jl(t)
, jl(t) ≥ |el(t)|
for t ∈ R≥0 implies |χl(t)| = |el(t)|jl(t) ≤ 1 for t ∈ R≥0, and
hence there is no overflow problem and the quantizer (25)-
(26) is valid for t ∈ R≥0. More importantly, jl(t) ≥ |el(t)|
for t ∈ R≥0 would make (27) hold for t ∈ R≥0.
On the actuator side, the decoding system is a copy of
the encoding system. Once there is a successful transmission
containing the encoded state, it recovers qRl(χl(zm)) based
on the received code and updates the predictor embedded
in the decoding system, and sends an acknowledgment back
to the encoding system. The acknowledgment would enable
the encoding system to know the successful transmission
reception. We assume that the encoding and decoding systems
have the same initial conditions. Therefore, identical structures
and initial conditions, and acknowledgments would guarantee
synchronization of all the signals in the encoding and decoding
systems.
The predictor in both the encoding and decoding systems
predicting x¯(t) is given by{
˙ˆx(t) = A¯xˆ(t) + B¯(t)u(t), t 6= zm
xˆ(t) = xˆ(t−)− Φ(t−), t = zm. (29)
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Fig. 3. Control architecture with encoding and decoding systems. The
black solid lines and dashed lines represent paths of signals computed by
embedded blocks and triggering signals generated by communication protocol,
respectively. The green dashed line represents the process that converts signals
into code and the blue one represents the reversed process.
As for the input u(t), we have u(t) = K¯(t)xˆ(t) where
K¯(t) = KS−1E(t)−1 ∈ Rnu×nx . In the encoding system,
u(t) is applied only to the predictor. In the decoding system,
u(t) is applied to both the predictor and actuator (see Figure
3).
The column vector Φ(t) in (29) is given by
Φ(t) =
 φ1(t)...
φnx(t)
 =
 j1(t)qR1(χ1(t))...
jnx(t)qRnx (χnx(t))
 (30)
where χl(t) =
el(t)
jl(t)
and jl(t) is the l-th entry in the column
vector J(t) = [j1(t) j2(t) · · · jnx(t)]T, which is the solution
to the impulsive system{
J˙(t) = A¯J(t), t 6= zm
J(t) = HJ(t−), t = zm
(31)
with
H = diag(2−R1I1, 2−R2I2, · · · , 2−RpIp) ∈ Rnx×nx (32)
where Ir ∈ Rnr×nr or Ir ∈ R2nr×2nr represents an identity
matrix corresponding to A¯r in (10) or (11), respectively. At
the moment of a successful transmission, J(t) in both the
encoding and decoding systems is updated according to the
second equation in (31). At last, the initial conditions of xˆ
and J in the encoding and decoding systems are identical and
satisfy {
xˆl(0
−) = 0,
jl(0
−) > |x¯l(0−)|, l = 1, 2, · · · , nx (33)
It is worth mentioning that Rl represents the number of
bits applied to the l-th quantized signal, which is element-wise
based. Since the l-th quantized signal must be associated with
one block A¯r (r = 1, 2, · · · , p), therefore, in this paper the data
rate analysis is based on the index of A¯r, and all the elements
corresponding to A¯r would apply Rr bits. For example, if the
l-th signal is associated with A¯r, then Rl = Rr. In the results
of this paper, we will obtain the bounds of {Rr}r=1,2,··· ,p, so
that {Rl}l=1,2,··· ,nx can be determined.
C. Overflow-free quantizer
In this part, our intention is to show that jl(t) ≥ |el(t)| for
t ∈ R≥0 with l = 1, 2, · · · , nx. Exploiting (28)-(30) and the
continuity of x¯(t) such that x¯(t) = x¯(t−), we have
el(t) = xˆl(t)− x¯l(t)
= xˆl(t
−)− x¯l(t−)− jl(t−)qRl
(
el(t
−)
jl(t−)
)
, t = zm
= el(t
−)− jl(t−)qRl(
el(t
−)
jl(t−)
) (34)
where l = 1, 2, · · · , nx. Hence the dynamics of e(t) obeys{
e˙(t) = A¯e(t), t 6= zm
e(t) = e(t−)− Φ(t−), t = zm (35)
Moreover, observing e(t) in (35) and J(t) in (31), one has
e˙(t) = A¯e(t),
J˙(t) = A¯J(t),
t 6= zm (36)
whose solutions are e(t) = eA¯te(0) and J(t) = eA¯tJ(0),
respectively, for 0 ≤ t < z0 (if z0 6= 0) or 0 ≤ t < z1 (if
z0 = 0), where
eA¯t = diag(U1(t), U2(t), · · · , Up(t)) (37)
with
Ur(t) = e
crtVr(t)⊗W, r = 1, 2, · · · , p (38)
where
Vr(t) =

1 t · · · · · · tnr−1(nr−1)!
1 t · · · tnr−2(nr−2)!
. . . . . .
...
. . . t
1

(39)
and
W =
{
1, if dr = 0
I, if dr 6= 0 (40)
in which I is as in (7).
By e(t) = eA¯te(0), one can obtain that |e(t)| ≤ eA¯t|e(0)|
holds element-wise, where | | denotes a function that com-
putes the absolute value of each element in a vector, i.e.
|e(t)| = [|e1(t)| |e2(t)| · · · |enx(t)|]T. Define the column
vector ε(t) := J(t) − |e(t)| = [ε1(t) ε2(t) · · · εnx(t)]T. If
z0 6= 0, one has
ε(t) = J(t)− |e(t)|
≥ eA¯tJ(0)− eA¯t|e(0)|, 0 ≤ t < z0
= eA¯tε(0). (41)
By (33), one knows that
ε(0) = J(0)− |e(0)|
= J(0)− |xˆ(0)− x¯(0)|
= J(0−)− |xˆ(0−)− x¯(0−)|
= J(0−)− |x¯(0−)| (42)
7and thus every element in the column vector ε(0) is positive,
which implies that every element in the column vector ε(t) is
positive for 0 ≤ t < z0. Thus, one can infer that jl(z−0 ) −
|el(z−0 )| > 0, and hence jl(z−0 ) − |el(z−0 )| ≥ 0. In view of
(34), it is clear that
|el(z0)| =
∣∣∣∣el(z−0 )− jl(z−0 )qRl (el(z−0 )jl(z−0 )
)∣∣∣∣
≤ jl(z
−
0 )
2Rl
= jl(z0) (43)
where the inequality is implied by (27) and the second equality
in (31), from which one obtains that |el(z0)| ≤ jl(z0) and
furthermore ε(z0) ≥ 0. Following the analysis as in (41), one
could obtain that ε(t) ≥ eA¯(t−z0)ε(z0) with z0 ≤ t < z1.
This implies that every element in ε(t) is non-negative and
|el(t)| ≤ jl(t) for z0 ≤ t < z1. By simple induction, we can
verify that |el(t)| ≤ jl(t) for t ∈ R≥0 if z0 6= 0.
If z0 = 0, we know that |el(z−0 )| = |el(0−)| = |x¯l(0−)| <
jl(0
−) = jl(z−0 ), and hence jl(z
−
0 )− |el(z−0 )| ≥ 0. Following
(43), one gets |el(z0)| ≤ jl(z0). The remaining part follows the
same analysis as in the scenario z0 6= 0 to obtain |el(t)| ≤ jl(t)
for t ∈ R≥0 when z0 = 0. Therefore, we conclude that
|el(t)| ≤ jl(t), l = 1, 2, · · · , nx, t ∈ R≥0 (44)
and thus the quantizer (25) does not undergo any overflow, and
(27) always holds. Notice that (44) holds for t ∈ R≥0, which
implies |el(t)| is always bounded by jl(t) in the absence or
presence of DoS attacks. Without losing generality, we focus
the attention from z0 onwards.
D. Dynamics of the encoding and decoding systems
Since the evolutions of the signals in the encoding and
decoding systems are identical, we would present this part
from the view of either the encoding or the decoding system,
and omit the other one.
Considering the impulsive system (31)–(32), we obtain that
J(zm) = He
A¯(zm−zm−1)J(zm−1)
= P (zm−1, zm)J(zm−1) (45)
where
P (zm−1, zm)
= HeA¯(zm−zm−1)
= diag(P1(zm−1, zm), P2(zm−1, zm), · · · , Pp(zm−1, zm)).
(46)
Note that P (zm−1, zm) is a block diagonal matrix in which
Pr(zm−1, zm) = 2−RrUr(∆m) (47)
with r = 1, 2, · · · , p, ∆m = zm − zm−1 and Ur(∆m) can be
obtained from (38).
Iteratively from (45), we obtain that
J(zm) =
m∏
k=1
P (zk−1, zk)J(z0)
= P (z0, zm)J(z0) (48)
where P (z0, zm) :=
∏m
k=1 P (zk−1, zk) is a
block diagonal matrix given by P (z0, zm) =
diag(P1(z0, zm), P2(z0, zm), · · · , Pp(z0, zm)) in which
Pr(z0, zm) =
m∏
k=1
Pr(zk−1, zk) (49)
with r = 1, 2, · · · , p.
Recall that {zm}m∈Z0 denotes the sequence of time instants
of the successful transmissions. Now we introduce a lemma
concerning the convergence of J(zm).
Lemma 4: Consider the dynamics of J(t) in (31)–(32) and
the DoS attacks in Assumptions 1 and 2 satisfying 1T +
∆
τD
< 1
with ∆ being the sampling interval of the network as in (2).
All the elements in the column vector J(zm) converge to zero
as zm →∞ if Rr satisfies
Rr
{
> 1
1− 1T − ∆τD
cr∆ log2 e, if cr ≥ 0
≥ 0, if cr < 0
r = 1, 2, · · · , p (50)
where cr is the real part of λr.
Proof. In this proof, we mainly show that ‖P (z0, zm)‖
converges to zero as zm → ∞ if 1T + ∆τD < 1 and (50) are
satisfied, which implies the convergence of J(zm).
According to (47) and (49), we have
Pr(z0, zm) =
m∏
k=1
Pr(zk−1, zk)
=
m∏
k=1
(2−RrUr(∆k))
= (2−Rr )mUr(
m∑
k=1
∆k). (51)
Substituting (38) into (51), we obtain
Pr(z0, zm)
=
ecr(zm−z0)
(2Rr )m
Vr(zm − z0)⊗W
=
ecr(zm−z0)(zm − z0)nr−1
(2Rr )m
Vr(zm − z0)
(zm − z0)nr−1 ⊗W. (52)
It is easy to verify that
Vr(zm − z0)
(zm − z0)nr−1 ⊗W
≤

1
(zm−z0)nr−1
1
(zm−z0)nr−2 · · · · · · 1
1
(zm−z0)nr−1
1
(zm−z0)nr−2 · · · 1(zm−z0)
. . . . . .
...
. . . 1
(zm−z0)nr−2
1
(zm−z0)nr−1

⊗W
≤

1
∆nr−1
1
∆nr−2 · · · · · · 1
1
∆nr−1
1
∆nr−2 · · · 1∆
. . . . . .
...
. . . 1
∆nr−2
1
∆nr−1
⊗W (53)
8which is upper bounded for zm − z0 ≥ ∆. Meanwhile,
exploiting that m = TS(z0, zm) in Lemma 3, we have
ecr(zm−z0)(zm − z0)nr−1
(2Rr )m
=
ecr(zm−z0)
(2Rr )TS(z0,zm)
(zm − z0)nr−1
≤ θr
 ecr
2Rr
1− 1
T
− ∆
τD
∆
zm−z0 (zm − z0)nr−1 (54)
where θr := 2
Rr(κ+η∆)
∆ . If (50) holds and 1T +
∆
τD
< 1, it is
simple to verify that
αr :=
ecr
2Rr
1− 1
T
− ∆
τD
∆
< 1. (55)
This implies that there exist a finite number Cr0 and µr < 0
such that
ecr(zm−z0)(zm − z0)nr−1
(2Rr )m
≤ θr(αr)zm−z0(zm − z0)nr−1
≤ Cr0eµr(zm−z0). (56)
In view of (52), (53) and (56), there exists a finite Cr1 such
that
‖Pr(z0, zm)‖ ≤ Cr0eµr(zm−z0)
∥∥∥∥ Vr(zm − z0)(zm − z0)nr−1 ⊗W
∥∥∥∥
≤ Cr1eµr(zm−z0) (57)
and hence we obtain that there exists finite C2 and µ such that
‖J(zm)‖ ≤ C2eµ(zm−z0)‖J(z0)‖. (58)
Finally we obtain the convergence of J(zm) when zm →∞.

After proving the convergence of J(zm), now we introduce
another lemma concerning the convergence of J(t) and e(t).
Lemma 5: Consider J(t) and e(t) whose dynamics are
given by (31)-(32) and (35), respectively. Suppose that the
DoS attacks in Assumptions 1 and 2 satisfy 1T +
∆
τD
< 1.
If the bit rate Rr satisfies (50), then J(t) and e(t) converge
exponentially to the origin.
Proof. According to (31), (58) and Lemma 2, for zm ≤ t <
zm+1, we have
‖J(t)‖ ≤ ev¯(t−zm)‖J(zm)‖
≤ ev(zm+1−zm)‖J(zm)‖
≤ C2ev(zm+1−zm)eµ(zm−z0)‖J(z0)‖
= C2e
v(zm+1−zm)eµ(zm+1−z0+zm−zm+1)‖J(z0)‖
= C2e
v(zm+1−zm)e−µ(zm+1−zm)eµ(zm+1−z0)‖J(z0)‖
≤ C2ev(Q+∆)e−µ(Q+∆)eµ(zm+1−z0)‖J(z0)‖
≤ γ0eµ(t−z0)‖J(z0)‖ (59)
where v = max{0, v¯} with v¯ = λmax( A¯+A¯T2 ) denoting the
logarithmic norm of A¯ and γ0 := C2ev(Q+∆)e−µ(Q+∆). Since
γ0 is finite and µ < 0, we conclude that J(t) exponentially
converges to the origin when t → ∞. In light of (44), one
could also obtain
‖e(t)‖ ≤ ‖J(t)‖ ≤ γ0eµ(t−z0)‖J(z0)‖ (60)
which implies the convergence of e(t). 
E. Main result
Now we are ready to present the main result of this paper.
Theorem 2: Consider the linear time-invariant process (1)
and its transformed system (8) with control action (29)-(33)
under the transmission policy in (2). The transmitted signals
are quantized by the uniform quantizer (25)-(26). Suppose that
the DoS attacks characterized in Assumptions 1 and 2 satisfy
1
T +
∆
τD
< 1. If the bit rate Rr with r = 1, 2, · · · , p satisfies
(50) then the state of the closed-loop system exponentially
converges to the origin.
Proof. Recall the control input u(t) = K¯(t)xˆ(t) =
KS−1E(t)−1xˆ(t) = Kxˆp(t), where xˆp(t) = S−1E(t)−1xˆ(t)
can be interpreted as the estimation of the original process
state x(t) in (1). Then one has the error between the estimation
of x(t) (i.e. xˆp(t)) and x(t) such that ep(t) := xˆp(t) − x(t).
Thus (1) can be rewritten as x˙(t) = (A+BK)x(t)+BKep(t),
whose solution is
x(t) = e(A+BK)(t−z0)x(z0) +
∫ t
z0
e(A+BK)(t−τ)BKep(τ)dτ
(61)
where t ∈ R≥z0 . From the equation above, one sees that the
stability of x(t) depends on ep(t). Thus, we analyze ep(t)
such that
ep(t) = xˆp(t)− x(t)
= S−1E(t)−1xˆ(t)− S−1E(t)−1x¯(t)
= S−1E(t)−1(xˆ(t)− x¯(t))
= S−1E(t)−1e(t). (62)
If 1T +
∆
τD
< 1 and Rr satisfies (50), then (60) holds. Then
one has
‖ep(t)‖ ≤ ‖S−1E(t)−1‖‖e(t)‖
≤ ‖S−1E(t)−1‖ γ0eµ(t−z0)‖J(z0)‖
≤ γ1eµ(t−z0)‖J(z0)‖. (63)
Note that such γ1 exists and is finite since ‖S−1E(t)−1‖ is
bounded. Taking the norm of both sides of the solution (61)
and applying (63), one has
‖x(t)‖ ≤ eσ(t−z0)‖x(z0)‖+
∫ t
z0
eσ(t−τ)‖BK‖‖ep(τ)‖dτ
≤ eσ(t−z0)‖x(z0)‖
+
∫ t
z0
eσ(t−τ)‖BK‖γ1eµ(τ−z0)‖J(z0)‖dτ
≤ eξ¯(t−z0)‖x(z0)‖
+
∫ t
z0
eξ¯(t−τ)‖BK‖γ1eξ¯(τ−z0)‖J(z0)‖dτ
≤ eξ¯(t−z0)‖x(z0)‖
+ (t− z0)eξ¯(t−z0)γ1‖BK‖‖J(z0)‖ (64)
9where σ < 0 is the logarithmic norm of A + BK and ξ¯ :=
max{µ, σ} ∈ R<0. Since ξ¯ < 0, there exist two finite reals
δ satisfying ξ¯ < δ < 0 and C3 such that (t − z0)eξ¯(t−z0) ≤
C3e
δ(t−z0). Then we have
‖x(t)‖ ≤ eδ(t−z0)(‖x(z0)‖+ C3γ1‖BK‖‖J(z0)‖). (65)
It is immediate to see that x(t) exponentially converges to the
origin as t→∞.
Moreover, in view of (59) and (60), and the fact that x¯(t) =
E(t)Sx(t) and ‖xˆ(t)‖ ≤ ‖e(t)‖ + ‖x¯(t)‖, we conclude that
J(t), e(t), x¯(t), xˆ(t) and x(t) exponentially converge to the
origin as t→∞. This completes the proof. 
Remark 3: We emphasize that this theorem characterizes
how the bit rate influences the system’s resilience. Condition
(50) can be rewritten as
1
T
+
∆
τD
< 1− cr∆ log2 e
Rr
, ∀cr ≥ 0 (66)
where Rr > 0. The inequality above explicitly quantifies how
the data rate affects the robustness, e.g. the larger Rr, the
smaller T and τD can be, which implies that the system
can tolerate more DoS attacks in terms of duration and
frequency, and still preserve stability. Figure 4 exemplifies this
characterization. 
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Fig. 4. Characterization of system resilience and data rate. The green dashed
curve is the function 1
T
+ ∆
τD
= 1 − cr∆ log2 e
Rr
with cr > 0. If the pair
(Rr,
1
T
+ ∆
τD
) is in the stable region (strictly under the green dashed curve),
then the system is stable. If cr = 0, the stable region is in rectangular shape.
Remark 4: In view of Theorem 2, if the network is reliable
(T = τD = ∞ and κ = η = 0), one obtains that the closed-
system is exponentially stable if Rr satisfies
Rr
{
> cr∆ log2 e, if cr ≥ 0
≥ 0, if cr < 0 r = 1, 2, · · · , p. (67)
To this end, we almost recover the result (Theorem 6) obtained
in [7], where no attacks were considered. By “almost”, we
mean that if one omits the disturbance and noise, and considers
asymptotic stabilization in [7], then the data rate in (67) and
Theorem 6 in [7] are equivalent and minimum, namely they
are necessary and sufficient conditions. This is the advantage
of the result achieved in this paper in the aspect of recovering
the minimum data rate, comparing with the one considering
output-feedback scenario in [25]. 
Under Theorem 2, the average data rate associated with the
successfully received packets is
Dd := lim
zm→∞
∑nx
l=1RlTS(z0, zm)
zm − z0
>
∑
k={l|cl≥0}
ck log2 e (68)
which essentially depends on the real parts of the eigenvalues
of the dynamic matrix of the process. The average data rate
associated with the transmission attempts is
De := lim
zm→∞
zm−z0
∆
∑nx
l=1Rl
zm − z0
=
∑nx
l=1Rl
∆
>
1
1− 1T − ∆τD
∑
k={l|cl≥0}
ck log2 e (69)
which is the corresponding result on packet size under DoS at-
tacks comparing with the achieved result in [37] where genuine
packet dropout is considered. Moreover, under a 100% reliable
network, one should have De = Dd, in which case what is
sent by the encoder is fully received by the decoder. Due to the
presence of DoS attacks, a larger average bit rate associated
with transmission attempts is needed, namely De > Dd, and
the lower bound of the average data rate associated with
transmission attempts is scaled by 1
1− 1T − ∆τD
∈ R≥1 in (69).
This reflects the need of redundant communication resources
to compensate for the side effect of DoS attacks.
F. Stability condition over the average data rate
We have shown that if Theorem 2 holds, then the closed-
loop system is stable. The setting there is that the number
of bits transmitted at zm (m = 0, 1, · · · ) are identical and
equivalent to Rr. In this subsection, we loosen the sufficient
condition above in the sense that the number of bits transmitted
at each successful transmission time (zm) does not have to
be identical. Later we will show that if the average value of
them is greater than 1
1− 1T − ∆τD
cr∆ log2 e with cr ≥ 0, then the
closed-loop system is still stable.
Assume that the number of bits assigned to each transmis-
sion attempt is arbitrary, and let Rr(tk) denote the number
of bits applied to each element corresponding to A¯r at tk.
Notice that Rr(t0), Rr(t1), · · · are not necessarily identical.
Due to the physical constraints of communication equipments,
it is practical to assume that the maximum number of bits
that the network can transmit in one transmission is finite,
namely Rr(tk) < ∞ for k ∈ Z0. This implies that the
average value R˜r,k :=
Rr(t0)+Rr(t1)+···+Rr(tk−1)
k < ∞. It
is easy to verify that {Rr(zm)} ⊆ {Rr(tk)} and R¯r,m :=
Rr(z0)+Rr(z1)+···+Rr(zm−1)
m <∞ for m = 1, 2, · · · .
Recall the definition of {tk}k∈Z0 and {zm}m∈Z0 . The
proposition below presents the sufficient condition for stability
concerning the average data rate.
Proposition 1: Under the transmission policy in (2), con-
sider the process (1) and its transformed system (8) with
control action (29)-(33) and the uniform quantizer (25)-(26),
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where Rl = Rr(tk) are arbitrary and finite at each tk. The
DoS attacks are characterized as in Assumptions 1 and 2
and satisfy 1T +
∆
τD
< 1. If the average value of bits along
{zm−1}m=1,2,··· satisfies
R¯r,m
{
> 1
1− 1T − ∆τD
cr∆ log2 e, if cr ≥ 0
≥ 0, if cr < 0
r = 1, 2, · · · , p
(70)
then the closed-loop system is stable.
Proof. By observing (51), we could obtain that Pr(z0, zm)
under the average data rate scenario is given by Pr(z0, zm) =
Ur(
∑m
k=1 ∆k)
∏m
k=1 2
−Rr(zk−1). Then we have
Pr(z0, zm)
= Ur(
m∑
k=1
∆k)
m∏
k=1
2−Rr(zk−1)
=
ecr(zm−z0)∏m
k=1 2
Rr(zk−1)
Vr(zm − z0)⊗W
=
ecr(zm−z0)(zm − z0)nr−1
(2R¯r,m)m
Vr(zm − z0)
(zm − z0)nr−1 ⊗W (71)
Exploiting that m = TS(z0, zm) in Lemma 3, we have
ecr(zm−z0)(zm − z0)nr−1
(2R¯r,m)m
≤ θ¯r,m(α¯r,m)zm−z0(zm − z0)nr−1 (72)
where θ¯r,m := 2
R¯r,m(κ+η∆)
∆ is finite and
α¯r,m :=
cr
2R¯r,m
1− 1
T
− ∆
τD
∆
< 1 (73)
if (70) holds. The rest of the proof can follow the analysis after
(55), and we obtain the stability of the closed-loop system. 
It is worth mentioning that Proposition 1 concerns the se-
quence of {Rr(zm)} instead of {Rr(tk)}. This expresses that
the average value of bits of all the successful transmissions,
namely R¯r,m for m = 1, 2, · · · , should satisfy (70), instead
of the average value of bits of all the transmissions attempts
i.e. R˜r,k. In fact, even if R˜r,k > 11− 1T − ∆τD
cr∆ log2 e, it is still
possible that R¯r,m ≤ 11− 1T − ∆τD cr∆ log2 e and instability mayoccur.
In practice, the proposition above can be satisfied by com-
puting the number of bits online so that stability can be guar-
anteed. For example, the coding systems can pre-compute the
number of bits right before each transmission attempt such that
if the transmission attempt succeeds then Proposition 1 holds.
However, this implementation may lead to a larger average bit
rate associated with the transmission attempts. Consider the
scenario when the communication devices attempt to transmit
a large number of bits to make Proposition 1 hold, but the DoS
is present. Then the communication devices would attempt to
send a large number of bits with each packet subsequently.
Note that in this case, attempts of constantly transmitting a
large number of bits are needed since it is not possible to
predict the next zm. If one fails the coming zm, Proposition
1 maybe violated and instability may occur.
IV. TIME-VARYING BIT RATE
In this section, we aim at designing a time-varying bit-rate
protocol, which preserves a comparable level of resilience
against DoS while promoting the possibility of saving bits
when the attack levels are low. Recalling A¯r in Lemma 1,
we equip the quantization systems corresponding to A¯r (r =
1, 2, · · · , p) with their own “clocks”. Due to the utilization
of the acknowledgment-based protocol, the acknowledgments
could enable the encoders to update the time sequences soon
after the updates of the time sequences in the decoders. This
facilitates the quantization systems to use a time-varying bit-
rate protocol, in which the number of bits is predetermined
before each transmission and depends on the generated time
sequences. In Theorem 2, we obtained a “standard” time-
invariant bit rate, namely Rr. Based on the obtained Rr, we
propose a time-varying bit-rate protocol.
We briefly introduce the intuition of the time-varying bit-
rate protocol. There are two scenarios.
Scenario 1: If the duration of a DoS attack is short, then
after the attack, a transmission with fewer bits is enough to
guarantee the decay of the quantization range and there is no
need to transmit a large number of bits. Actually, it is this
mechanism that saves bits compared with the time-invariant
bit-rate protocol.
Scenario 2: If the duration of a DoS attack is long, then the
quantization systems may not be able to obtain the decay of the
quantization range with one transmission, even by applying the
maximum bit rate. Confronted by this problem, the transmitter
attempts to send packets with the maximum number of bits,
e.g. Rr, for longer time until the quantization range is restored
to the level smaller than the one before the “long-time DoS”
occurs.
In the time-varying bit-rate protocol, both the encoding
and decoding systems consist of two major parts: A) bit-
computing parts and B) coding parts. The bit-computing parts
pre-determine the number of bits for encoding and decoding
(before each transmission attempt instant tk), and the coding
parts are responsible for encoding or decoding signals at tk,
by applying the pre-determined number of bits.
A. Bit-computing parts
The bit-computing parts mainly generate sequences of
time instants and then based on the time sequences, they
pre-determine the number of bits for the transmission at-
tempts. Note that both the encoding and decoding systems are
equipped with the identical bit-computing parts and coding
parts.
We first introduce sequences of time instants generated by
the bit-computing parts in the encoding and decoding systems,
i.e. {srg} = {sr0, sr1, sr2, · · · } ⊆ {zm} with r = 1, 2, · · · , p and
g ∈ Z0. In Section IV. C, we will show that the state corre-
sponding to A¯r strictly decays along {srg} = {sr0, sr1, sr2, · · · }
with r = 1, 2, · · · , p. In particular, we have{
srg = min{zm > srg−1 | e
cr(zm−srg−1)
(2Rr )
TS(s
r
g−1,zm)
< 1}
sr0 = z0
(74)
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where Rr satisfies Theorem 2. Note that due to the acknowl-
edgments, {srg} can be synchronized in the encoding and
decoding systems. Here abusing the notation, TS(srg−1, zm)
represents the number of successful transmissions during
]srg−1, zm]. Since the number of successful transmissions dur-
ing ]srg−1, zm] and [s
r
g−1, zm[ are the same, then Lemma 3 is
still valid when we refer to ]srg−1, zm]. By applying Lemma
3 we have
ecr(zm−s
r
g−1)
(2Rr )TS(s
r
g−1,zm)
≤ θr(αr)zm−srg−1 . (75)
Note that αr < 1 (in (55)) and θr is finite if Theorem 2 holds.
Then there always exists the smallest and finite zm > srg−1
such that e
cr(zm−srg−1)
(2Rr )
TS(s
r
g−1,zm)
≤ θr(αr)zm−srg−1 < 1. Hence
according to (74), we have that srg − srg−1 is finite when
Theorem 2 holds.
The pre-determined number of bits in the encoding and
decoding systems for the transmission attempts follows
Rl(t−k )
= Rr(t
−
k )
=
min{Rr(t−k ), Rr}, if e
cr(t
−
k
−srg−1)
(2Rr )
TS(s
r
g−1,t
−
k
)+1
< 1
Rr, otherwise
(76)
where Rr(t−k ) := dwr(t−k −srg−1) log2 ee, tk ∈]srg−1, srg], wr ∈
R>cr , Rr satisfies Theorem 2 and r is the index of A¯r that
the l-th element corresponds to.
Note that Rl(tk) = Rr(tk) = Rr(t−k ) and if tk is a
successful transmission instant such that tk = zm, then
TS(s
r
g−1, t
−
k ) + 1 = TS(s
r
g−1, zm). By TS(s
r
g−1, t
−
k ) + 1, it
simply means that before the real transmission attempt at tk,
the bit-computing parts first estimate e
cr(t
−
k
−srg−1)
(2Rr )
TS(s
r
g−1,t
−
k
)+1
by
assuming that tk would be a successful transmission instant.
If it estimates that by using Rr bits at tk, the system would
have e
cr(t
−
k
−srg−1)
(2Rr )
TS(s
r
g−1,t
−
k
)+1
< 1, then according to (76) by using
min{Rr(tk), Rr} bits at tk, the system would still have
ecr(t
−
k −srg−1)
2RrTS(s
r
g−1,t
−
k )+min{Rr(tk),Rr}
≤ e
cr(t
−
k −srg−1)
2RrTS(s
r
g−1,t
−
k ) min{ewr(t−k −srg−1), 2Rr}
< 1 (77)
which in turn implies the decay of the quantization range
(see Section IV. C). Since min{Rr(t−k ), Rr} ≤ Rr, we
achieve the possibility of the reduction of bits. For the ease of
visualization, the evolution of e
cr(zm−srg−1)
(2Rr )
TS(s
r
g−1,zm)
(cr > 0), {srg}
and the applied number of bits are exemplified in Figure 5.
B. Coding parts
In the last part, we obtain the pre-determined number of
bits applied to each transmission attempt. By applying such a
number of bits, the coding parts consisting of the quantizers
( )
( , )
, 1, 0, 1...
(2 )
r
r g k
S g kr
c t s
T s tR
e
k



 
1
t0
Rr Rr RrBits:
srg-1 srg srg+1 srg+2
Rr* Rr* Rr* Rr*
Fig. 5. The evolution of e
cr(zm−srg−1)
(2Rr )
TS(s
r
g−1,zm)
and {srg}. The instants of
successful transmissions (zm) are indicated by the red lines, at which there
are the values of e
cr(zm−srg−1)
(2Rr )
TS(s
r
g−1,zm)
being indicated by the blue solid dots
and the number of applied bits (Rr or R∗r := min{Rr, Rr}). Among the
instants of successful transmissions, we highlight the sequence {srg}, at which
the values of e
cr(zm−srg−1)
(2Rr )
TS(s
r
g−1,zm)
are smaller than 1. The dashed blue curves
represent the evolution due to ecrt and the solid blue lines represent their
drops due to the successful transmissions.
(78)-(79), the impulsive system of quantization range (83) and
the predictor (84) are introduced in this part.
The uniform quantizer in (25) with time-varying bits is
qRl(tk)(χl) :=
{
b2Rl(tk)−1χlc+0.5
2Rl(tk)−1
, if − 1 ≤ χl < 1
1− 0.5
2Rl(tk)−1
, if χl = 1
(78)
if Rl(tk) > 0, and in particular,
qRl(tk)(χl) = 0 (79)
if Rl(tk) = 0. Likewise, the property∣∣∣∣el − jlqRl(t)(eljl
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ jl2Rl(t) , if |el|jl ≤ 1 (80)
still holds in the time-varying-bit scenario.
Note that in the time-varying bit-rate design, the coding
parts are the same as in (29)-(33) except that Φ(t) in (30) and
H in (32) should be changed into the time-varying-bit forms
Φ¯(t) and H(t), respectively. In Φ¯(t), the number of bits are
time-varying instead of time-invariant, and we have
Φ¯(t) =
 φ¯1(t)...
φ¯nx(t)
 =
 j1(t)qR1(t)(χ1(t))...
jnx(t)qRnx (t)(χnx(t))
 (81)
Meanwhile, H(t) is given by
H(t) = diag(2−R1(t)I1, 2−R2(t)I2, · · · , 2−Rp(t)Ip) (82)
and we let Hr(t) := 2−Rr(t)Ir. Then we have the impulsive
system for obtaining the quantization range{
J˙(t) = A¯J(t), if t 6= zm
J(t) = H(t)J(t), if t = zm
(83)
At last, the predictor in the time-varying bit-rate design is
given by {
˙ˆx(t) = A¯xˆ(t) + B¯(t)u(t), t 6= zm
xˆ(t) = xˆ(t−)− Φ¯(t−), t = zm (84)
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where u(t) = K¯xˆ(t) and (33) holds. By applying a very
similar analysis as in Section III. C, one could see that there
is no over-flow problem of the quantization systems under the
time-varying bit-rate protocol.
In view of (74), (76) and the coding parts, the mechanism
of the time-varying bit-rate protocol can be outlined as
1) Set sr0 = z0.
2) Let tk be the transmission attempt instant after srg−1
such that srg−1 < tk ≤ srg . At t−k , the bit-computing
parts in the encoding and decoding systems calculate
e
cr(t
−
k
−srg−1)
(2Rr )
TS(s
r
g−1,t
−
k
)+1
.
2.1) If e
cr(t
−
k
−srg−1)
(2Rr )
TS(s
r
g−1,t
−
k
)+1
< 1, then in view of (76), we
have Rl(t−k ) = Rr(t−k ) = min{Rr(t−k ), Rr}, and
Rr(tk) = Rr(t
−
k ) in the bit-computing parts.
2.1.1) If the transmission succeeds (tk = zm), update
J in (83), xˆ in (84) by using the number of bits
determined in 2.1), and update srg = zm in light of
(74) in both the encoding and decoding systems.
Then we are at 2) with srg−1 becoming s
r
g and
wait for the next tk and repeat 2).
2.1.2) If the transmission fails, wait for the next tk and
repeat 2).
2.2) If e
cr(t
−
k
−srg−1)
(2Rr )
TS(s
r
g−1,t
−
k
)+1
≥ 1, then according to (76),
we have Rl(t−k ) = Rr(t−k ) = Rr, and Rr(tk) =
Rr(t
−
k ).
2.2.1) If the transmission succeeds, update J in (83), xˆ
in (84) by using the number of bits determined in
2.2) in both the encoding and decoding systems.
Then wait for the next tk and repeat 2).
2.2.2) If the transmission fails, wait for the next tk and
repeat 2).
C. Stability analysis
For the ease of conveying the ideas, we focus our analysis
on the dynamics corresponding to A¯r. From (83), it is easy to
obtain that
Jr(s
r
g) = P¯r(s
r
g−1, s
r
g)Jr(s
r
g−1) (85)
with
P¯r(s
r
g−1, s
r
g) = e
A¯r(s
r
g−srg−1)
∏
srg−1<zm≤srg
Hr(zm) (86)
where Hr(zm) = 2−Rr(zm)Ir and Jr is the subset of J
corresponding to A¯r. Since eA¯r(s
r
g−srg−1) = Ur(srg − srg−1)
is upper-triangular whose eigenvalues equal to ecr(s
r
g−srg−1),
and
∏
srg−1<zm≤srg Hr(zm) is diagonal, it is easy to obtain the
eigenvalues of P¯r(srg−1, s
r
g) such that
λr(P¯r(s
r
g−1, s
r
g)) =
ecr(s
r
g−srg−1)∏
srg−1<zm≤srg 2
Rr(zm)
(87)
Iteratively, it is easy to verify that
Jr(s
r
g) =
g∏
k=1
P¯r(s
r
k−1, s
r
k)Jr(s
r
0) (88)
Recall the definition of {srg} in (74). The next lemma
concerns the convergence of Jr(srg).
Lemma 6: Consider the impulsive system as in (82)–(83)
and the DoS attacks in Assumptions 1 and 2 satisfying 1T +
∆
τD
< 1 with ∆ being the sampling interval of the network as
in (2). The time-varying-bit quantizer is given by (78)-(79),
where Rr satisfies Theorem 2 and wr > cr. Then, all the
elements in the column vector Jr(srg) converge to zero as g →
∞ with r = 1, 2, · · · , p.
Proof. In the proof, we would like to show that the eigenval-
ues of P¯r(srg−1, s
r
g) satisfy λr(P¯r(s
r
g−1, s
r
g)) < 1 for g ∈ Z1.
Let z∗m denote the first successful transmission instant
after srg−1. If
e
cr(z
∗−
m −srg−1)
(2Rr )TS(sg−1,z
∗−
m )+1
= e
cr(z
∗
m−srg−1)
(2Rr )TS(sg−1,z
∗
m)
=
e
cr(z
∗
m−srg−1)
2Rr
< 1, then according to (76), min{Rr(z∗m), Rr}
would be applied for coding. Hence based on (87), we obtain
that
λr(P¯r(s
r
g−1, z
∗
m)) =
ecr(z
∗
m−srg−1)∏
srg−1<zm≤z∗m 2
Rr(zm)
=
ecr(z
∗
m−srg−1)
2Rr(s
r
g)
=
ecr(z
∗
m−srg−1)
2min{Rr(z∗m),Rr}
< 1 (89)
where the inequality is implied by the hypothesis. Meanwhile,
we see that such z∗m qualifies (74) and hence s
r
g = z
∗
m. One
obtains that λr(P¯r(srg−1, s
r
g)) < 1.
If e
cr(z
∗−
m −srg−1)
(2Rr )TS(sg−1,z
∗−
m )+1
= e
cr(z
∗
m−srg−1)
(2Rr )TS(sg−1,z
∗
m)
= e
cr(z
∗
m−srg−1)
2Rr
≥
1, then according to (76), the coding systems would apply Rr
bits at z∗m and during ]z
∗
m, z
∗∗
m ] where z
∗∗
m > z
∗
m. Therefore,
according to (87), we obtain that
λr(P¯r(s
r
g−1, z
∗∗
m )) =
ecr(z
∗∗
m −srg−1)∏
srg−1<zm≤z∗∗m 2
Rr(zm)
=
ecr(z
∗
m−srg−1)
2Rr
ecr(z
∗∗
m −z∗m)
(2Rr )TS(z
∗
m,z
∗∗
m )
=
ecr(z
∗∗
m −srg−1)
(2Rr )TS(s
r
g−1,z∗∗m )
< 1 (90)
where the rationale of the inequality and the existence of
such z∗∗m have been discussed in (75) and the discussion
thereafter. Hence such z∗∗m is denoted by s
r
g and we have
λr(P¯r(s
r
g−1, s
r
g)) < 1.
In either case, we have shown that λr(P¯r(srg−1, s
r
g)) < 1,
which implies that {P¯r(srg−1, srg)}g∈Z1 is a sequence of stable
matrices and there exist finite Cr4 and 0 < βr < 1 such that
‖Jr(srg)‖ ≤ Cr4(βr)g‖Jr(sr0)‖ in view of (88). Therefore, one
can infer that Jr(srg)→ 0 when g →∞ with r = 1, 2, · · · , p.
This completes the proof. 
In view of the dynamics of J(t), we have
‖Jr(t)‖ ≤ Cr4evr(t−s
r
g−1)(βr)
g−1‖Jr(sr0)‖ (91)
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where srg−1 < t ≤ srg and vr = max{0, v¯r} with v¯r =
λmax(
A¯r+A¯
T
r
2 ). Since 0 < βr < 1 and s
r
g − srg−1 is finite,
one knows that there exist finite γ¯r and µ¯r < 0 such that
‖Jr(t)‖ ≤ γ¯reµ¯r(t−sr0)‖Jr(sr0)‖. This implies that there exists
finite γ¯ and µ¯ < 0 such that ‖J(t)‖ ≤ γ¯eµ¯(t−z0)‖J(z0)‖
with r = 1, 2, · · · , p by noticing that sr0 = z0. Since |e|
is upper bounded by J , we obtain that ‖e(t)‖ ≤ ‖J(t)‖ ≤
γ¯eµ¯(t−z0)‖J(z0)‖.
Theorem 3: Consider the process (1) with control action
(81)-(84) under the transmission policy in (2). Suppose the
DoS attacks characterized as in Assumptions 1 and 2 and
satisfy 1T +
∆
τD
< 1. The transmitted signals are quantized
by the time-varying-bit quantizer (78)-(79) where Rr satisfies
Theorem 2 and wr > cr. Then the closed-loop system is
exponentially stable.
Proof. Since e(t) exponentially converges to the origin in
view of Lemma 6 and the discussion thereafter, following the
very similar calculation as in the proof of Theorem 2, one can
obtain the exponential stability of the closed-loop system. 
Remark 5: It is worth mentioning that the reduction of bits
is achieved by sacrificing the decay rate of the system, i.e. the
system converges in a slower rate compared with the one under
the time-invariant bit-rate protocol. This is due to the fact
that in the absence of DoS attacks or after short-duration DoS
attacks, the time-invariant bit-rate protocol is able to apply Rr
bits, while the time-varying bit-rate protocol can only apply
min{Rr(tk), Rr} bits (cf. Figure 5). 
Remark 6: One sees that the system under control is stable
if one chooses wr and Rr properly. It is easy to make the
design parameter wr > cr and hence we omit the influence
of it. Then Rr is the only parameter affecting the robustness
of the system under time-varying bit-rate protocol. In view
of Remark 3, we characterize the system’s robustness under
time-varying bit-rate protocol such that if (66) holds, then the
stability of the closed-loop system can be preserved. 
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
For simplicity, we consider a process that is in Jordan form
and taken from [38]. The system to be controlled is open-loop
unstable and is characterized by the matrices
A = A˜ = A¯ =
[
1 1
0 1
]
, B = B˜ = B¯(t) =
[
1 0
0 1
]
(92)
The state-feedback matrix is given by
K = K¯(t) =
[−2.1961 −0.7545
−0.7545 −2.7146
]
(93)
The eigenvalues of A are 1.
The network transmission interval is given by ∆ = 0.1s. We
consider a sustained DoS attack with variable period and duty
cycle, generated randomly. Over a simulation horizon of 20s,
the DoS signal yields |Ξ(0, 20)| = 15.52s and n(0, 20) = 20.
This corresponds to values (averaged over 20s) of τD ≈ 0.96
and T ≈ 1.29, and ∼ 80% of transmission failures. It is simple
to verify that
∆
τD
+
1
T
≈ 0.8793 (94)
Fig. 6. Simulation plots of x(t). Top picture–State under time-invariant bit-
rate protocol; Bottom picture–State under time-varying bit-rate protocol.
According to Theorem 2, we obtain that
R1 >
cr∆
1− 1T − ∆τD
log2 e = 1.1953 (95)
Then we select R1 = 2. Meanwhile, considering the choice
of w1 satisfying w1 > c1 = 1, we let w1 = 2 for the
time-varying bit-rate protocol. The simulation results of x(t)
are shown in Figure 6. We see that x(t) converges to the
equilibrium in both protocols. In particular, the state in the
bottom picture converges with a slightly lower speed. This is
due to the fact that in the absence of DoS or after a “short-
duration” DoS attack, the network transmits fewer bits (cf.
Remark 5). This can be observed from Figure 7. One could
see that the convergence of J(t) under time-varying bit-rate
protocol shown in the middle picture of Figure 7 (the numbers
of bits applied in the time-varying bit-rate protocol are shown
in the bottom picture of Figure 7) is slower than the one under
time-invariant bit-rate protocol as shown in the top picture of
Figure 7.
In fact, the obtained values of bit rate are conservative in
the time-invariant bit-rate protocol. The stability can be still
preserved at the lower rate with R1 = 1 under the same pattern
of DoS attacks. One factor contributing to the conservativeness
is that the actual number of successful transmissions is much
larger than the theoretical value computed in Lemma 3.
From another viewpoint, if the data rate of the channel
is pre-selected as R1 = 2, the closed-loop system should
be stable under the attacks in this example since the DoS
parameters satisfy 1T +
∆
τD
≈ 0.8793 < 1− c1∆ log2 eR1 = 0.9279.
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Fig. 7. Simulation plots. Top picture–J(t) under time-invariant bit-rate
protocol, where the total number of bits associated with all transmission
attempts over 20s is 800; Middle picture–J(t) under time-varying bit-rate
protocol, where the total number of bits associated with all transmission
attempts over 20s is 452; Bottom picture–successful transmitted bits under
time-varying bit-rate protocol.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the data rate problem for stabilizing control
of a networked control system under limited bandwidth and
Denial-of-Service attacks. It was shown that the sufficient
condition of bit rate for stabilization depends on the unstable
eigenvalues of the dynamic matrix of the process as well as the
DoS parameters. Furthermore, the design of time-varying bit-
rate protocol is proven to be effective in saving bits meanwhile
maintaining the comparable resilience as the one under time-
invariant bit-rate protocol. It is emphasized that the results of
the paper clearly indicate the trade-offs between the amount
of transmitted data and the robustness against DoS attacks.
In particular, the approach is in accordance with the recent
studies on the minimum data rate control problems.
In the future, disturbance and noise might be taken into
consideration. Moreover, the analysis in this paper can be
possibly applied to achieve the corresponding bit-rate bounds
under the different packet-drop models considered in [39].
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall A˜ in (4), Ar in (5) and (6)
representing the Jordan block associated with real and complex
eigenvalues, respectively. Let
E(t) =

E1(t)
E2(t)
. . .
Ep(t)
 ∈ Rnx×nx (96)
with p ∈ Z1, where
Er(t) =

1
1
. . .
1
 ∈ Rnr×nr (97)
corresponds to the real eigenvalue λr = cr, and
Er(t) =

$r(t)
$r(t)
. . .
$r(t)
 ∈ R2nr×2nr (98)
with
$r(t) =
[
cos(drt) sin(drt)
− sin(drt) cos(drt)
]
(99)
corresponds to the complex eigenvalues λr = cr ± dri (dr 6=
0).
Since x¯(t) = E(t)x˜(t), it is easy to verify that
˙¯x(t) = E(t) ˙˜x(t) + E˙(t)x˜(t)
= E(t)(A˜x˜(t) + B˜u(t)) + E˙(t)x˜(t)
= E(t)A˜E(t)−1x¯(t) + E˙(t)E(t)−1x¯(t) + E(t)B˜u(t)
= (E(t)A˜E(t)−1 + E˙(t)E(t)−1)x¯(t) + E(t)B˜u(t).
(100)
Let A¯ := E(t)A˜E(t)−1 + E˙(t)E(t)−1 =
diag(A¯1, A¯2, · · · , A¯p) and B¯(t) := E(t)B˜, where
A¯r := Er(t)A˜rEr(t)
−1 + E˙r(t)Er(t)−1. (101)
If the eigenvalues associated with Ar are real, then Er(t)
is an identity matrix in (97) with order nr and hence the
derivative of Er(t) is a matrix with only zero entries, which
implies that
A¯r = Er(t)A˜rEr(t)
−1 + E˙r(t)Er(t)−1
= A˜r =

cr 1
cr 1
. . . 1
cr
 . (102)
If the eigenvalues associated with Ar are complex, i.e. λr =
cr ± dri with dr 6= 0, then Er(t) is a time-varying matrix as
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in (98), whose derivative is not zero any longer. It is simple
to verify that
Er(t)A˜rEr(t)
−1 =

Dr I
Dr I
. . . I
Dr
 (103)
with Er(t) being in (98) and recalling that
Dr =
[
cr −dr
dr cr
]
, I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
(104)
On the other hand, we have
E˙r(t)Er(t)
−1 =

Fr
Fr
. . .
Fr
 , whereFr =
[
0 dr
−dr 0
]
.
(105)
Thus,
A¯r =Er(t)A˜Er(t)
−1 + E˙r(t)Er(t)−1
=

crI I
crI I
. . . I
crI
 . (106)
Considering the two scenarios in (102) and (106), we obtain
the result as in Lemma 1. This completes the proof. 
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